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BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
to clarify the federal laws which authorize states to enact residence requirements,
a direct attack on these federal statutes will probably be the only way to fin-
ally resolve the residency requirement problem.
ROBERT M. FEINSON
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-THE SERVICEMAN'S RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN
A SPECIAL COURT-MARTIAL
Petitioner was convicted in two separate court-martials and sentenced to
confinement with forfeiture of two-thirds of his pay for six months. Prior to
trial, the petitioner had requested the appointment of legally qualified civilian
or military defense counsel. The request was denied. The court then appointed,
as defense counsel, an officer who was not legally trained but who had training
comparable to that of trial counsel as required by the Uniform Code of Military
Justice, sections 827 and 828.1 After exhausting military appellate review, the
petitioner filed a writ of Habeas Corpus in the United States District Court,
which was dismissed.2 Appeal was then taken to the Court of Appeals, which
affirmed the district court decision and held: The appointment of non-legally
trained counsel in a special court-martial was not violative of the sixth amend-
ment right to counsel or of the fifth amendment right to a fair trial under the
due process clause. Kennedy v. Commandant, 377 F.2d 339 (10th Cir. 1967).
The judicial system of the Army, Navy and Air Force is defined by the
Uniform Code of Military Justice.8 The Code provides for a General Courts-
Martial, Special Courts-Martial and Summary Courts-Martial. 4 The officer in
a defendant's chain of command decides before which of the three courts a
defendant will be tried. The Courts-Martial jurisdictions are differentiated by
the extent of the punishment that may be applied to a convicted defendant. A
General Court-Martial may prescribe any punishment, including a penalty of
1. See 10 U.S.C. § 827 (1964) which provides:
(a) For each general and special court-martial the authority convening the court
shall detail trial counsel and defense counsel, and such assistants as he con-
siders appropriate ...
(c) In the case of a special court-martial-
(1) if the trial counsel is qualified to act as counsel before a general court-
martial, the defense counsel detailed by the convening authority must be
a person similarly qualified; and
(2) if the trial counsel is a judge advocate, or a law specialist, or a member
of the bar of a Federal court or the highest court of a State, the de-
fense counsel detailed by the convening authority must be one of the
foregoing....
Id. § 838 provides:
(b) The accused has the right to be represented in his defense before a general or
special court-martial by civilian counsel if provided by him, or by military
counsel of his own selection if reasonably available, or by the defense counsel
detailed under Section 827 of this title (article 27). ...
2. 258 F. Supp. 967 (D. Kan. 1966).
3. 10 U.S.C. §§ 101-2771 (1964).
4. Id. § 816.
RECENT CASES
death.5 In a General Court-Martial the defendant is required to have counsel
who is a graduate of an accredited law school or a member of the bar of a
federal court or of the highest court of a state.6 A Special Court-Martial may
render authorized punishment not exceeding a maximum sentence of confinement
for six months or hard labor without confinement for three months, forfeiture
of two-thirds pay per month for six months and a bad conduct discharge if
a full trial record is prepared. 7 In a Special Court-Martial the defendant must
have counsel with training comparable to that of the trial counsel,8 although
neither need be legally qualified as in a General Court-Martial.
From the early days of the republic the courts of the military and civilian
spheres of our government have existed and developed separately from one
another.9 Chief Justice Vinson, in Burns v. Wilson, stated that:
Military law, like state law, is a jurisprudence which exists separate
and apart from the law which governs in our federal judicial establish-
ment. This Court has played no role in its development; we have
exerted no supervisory power over the courts which enforce it; the
rights of men in the armed forces must perforce be conditioned to meet
certain overriding demands of discipline and duty, and the civil
courts are not the agencies which must determine the precise balance
to be struck in this adjustment. The Framers expressly entrusted that
task to Congress.'"
Following this line of reasoning, all the constitutional rights of a defendant in
a civilian criminal proceeding do not necessarily apply to a defendant in a
military proceeding." Such a defendant can bring his appeal to a civilian court
only collaterally,' 2 and the scope of review is limited.1 However, this does not
mean that the service man or woman is wholly denied the rights afforded his
civilian counterpart. The United States Court of Military Appeals, referred
to by Mr. Justice Warren "as a sort of civilian 'Supreme Court' of the mili-
5. Id. § 818.
6. Id. § 827(1), Manual for Courts-Martial § 6B.
7. Id. § 819.
8. Id. §§ 827(c), 838(b).
9. See, e.g., Burns v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137 (1953); Dynes v. Hoover, 61 U.S. (20 How.)
65 (1857); United States v. Culp, 14 U.S.C.M.A. 199, 33 C.M.R. 411 (1963); Comment,
Constitutional Rights of Servicemen Before Courts-Martial, 64 Colum. L. Rev. 127 (1964);
Comment, Lawyer-Counsel in Special Courts-Martial, 23 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 142, 140
(1966).
10. Burns v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137, 140 (1953).
11. See, e.g., Hiatt v. Brown, 339 U.S. 103 (1950); United States v. Culp, 14
U.S.CM.A. 199, 33 C.M.R. 411 (1963); United States v. Jacoby, 11 U.S.C.MA. 428, 29
C.M.R. 244 (1960); see also J. Snedecker, Military Justice Under the Uniform Code 446
(1953); Wiener, Courts-Martial and the Bill of Rights: The Original Practice I, 11, 72 Harv.
L. Rev. 1, 266 (1958); Comment, Right to Counsel and the Serviceman, 15 Catholic U.L.
Rev. 203 (1966); Comment, An Accused is Entitled to Representation at a Special Court-
Martial by Legally Trained Counsel, 4 Houston L. Rev. 126 (1966).
12. See, e.g., Burns v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137 (1953); Ex parte Vallandigham, 68 U.S.
(1 Wall.) 243 (1863); Shaw v. United States, 288 F.2d 811 (D.C. Cir. 1954); Warren,
The Bill of Rights and the Military, 37 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 18 (1962); Comment, 76 Yale L. J.
380 (1966).
13. Hiatt v. Brown, 339 U.S. 103 (1950), cited in Burns v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137, 139
(1953).
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tary,' 14 recently stated that "the protections in the Bill of Rights, except those
which are expressly or by necessary implication inapplicable, are available to
members of our armed forces."'15 In United States v. Culp,"' the court went
even further when it stated, "It is abundantly clear that defendants before
military tribunals are, by law, provided with and shielded by a mantle of
valuable protection extending to areas but recently the subject of discussion
by the Supreme Court." Nevertheless, it is also clear that military personnel
do not enjoy some of the constitutional rights that a civilian is entitled to. The
only express distinction in the Constitution is that the military defendant has
no right to indictment by grand jury.17 Historically, the full right of freedom
of speech,' s the right of bail,' 9 and the right to trial by petit jury20 have been
denied the serviceman.
While it has been argued that the sixth amendment right to effective coun-
sel was meant to apply to military defendants,2 1 most cases and authors have
denied this contention.22 Frederick Wiener, in a leading article, states:
Neither the 1799 nor the 1800 Articles for the Government of the
Navy made any mention of counsel for the prisoner....
In the 1806 Articles of War, there is not only no provision for
any counsel for the accused, but article 69-taken verbatim from
article 6 of 1786-indicates that Congress considered that an accused
soldier was on his own while standing trial . . . reflects the Black-
stonian common-law notion of the judge as counsel for the prisoner
rather than the sixth amendment's guarantee of the assistance of
counsel.
2 3
Early commentators suggest that the right of counsel, if applied at all,
did not require the same type of counsel required in a civilian trial of that day,
and certainly not the same right to effective counsel as applied in civilian trials
of today. In more recent times, the sixth amendment right to counsel in the
civilian sphere has been broadened to include the right to effective counsel
2 4
14. Warren, supra note 12, at 188.
15. United States v. Jacoby, 11 U.S.C.M.A. 428, 430-31, 29 C.M.R. 244, 246-47
(1960); United States v. Welch i 3 C.M.R. 136 (1952).
16. United States v. Culp, 14 U.S.C.M.A. 199, 33 C.M.R. 411, 415 (1963), citing
Lowe v. Brown, 372 U.S. 477 (1963); Draper v. Washington, 372 U.S. 487 (1963);
Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
17. U.S. Const. amend. V.
18. 1806 Articles of War, arts. 3, 5, 53, 57, 2 Stat. 360, 366 (1806); See J. Winthrop,
Military Law and Precedent 698-21, 625-26 (2d ed. 1920).
19. 1806 Articles of War, art. 78, 2 Stat. 369 (1806).
20. See, e.g., Whelchel v. McDonald, 340 U.S. 122, 127 (1950); Comment, 64 Colum.
L. Rev. 127 (1964).
21. Henderson, Courts-Martial and the Court: The Original Understanding, 71 Harv.
L. Rev. 293 (1957).
22. See, e.g., United States v. Culp, 14 U.S.C.M.A. 199, 33 C.M.R. 411, 427-28; 3.
Macomb, Martial Law Court-Martial as Practiced In the United States of America 93-96
(1809); P. Maltby, Courts-Martial and Military Law 73-76 (1813); Wiener, supra note 11;
Comment 64 Colum. L. Rev. 127 (1964).
23. Wiener, supra note 11, at 22 (Footnotes omitted.).
24., See, e.g., Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 56, 58 (1952).
536
RECENT CASES
and, where defendant is indigent, the right to state appointed counsel.25 Further,
the defendant's right to counsel has been extended so as to commence at the
point of initial custody.26 In contrast, the mandate for. the right to effective
counsel for the military defendant is not as clear. A defendant before a General
Court-Martial is granted the right to legally trained counsel in both the pre-
trial and trial proceedings,27 but this right generally has been denied the de-
fendant in a Special Court-Martial proceeding.28 There have been exceptional
cases, however, where the denial of legally trained counsel in a Special Court-
Martial has been considered sufficiently prejudicial to warrant reveral of a
defendant's conviction.29 In United States v. Culp, the court stated:
We have never hesitated to reverse convictions even though the error
be not assigned before us, for any prejudicial action appearing therein,
including . . . adequacy of representation by counsel; reasonable
availability of individual military counsel requested by accused; fair
opportunity to be represented by civilian counsel.
30
In contrast, commentators have stated that "the court usually disagrees
with contentions of the accused that he was not represented adequately by
counsel." 31 Some courts have attempted to grapple with the clear wording of the
statute, as in United States v. Sutton where the court said:
Surely we are seeking to place military justice on the same plane as
civilian justice, but we are powerless to do that in those instances where
Congress has set out legally, clearly, and specifically a different level.
32
Other courts have said the sixth amendment does apply to military defendants,
but that the articles in the Uniform Code of Military Justice comply with the
sixth amendment. Courts have recognized the problem of the right to counsel
in a Special Court-Martial, and in previous cases33 strong arguments have been
formulated for allowing all military defendants the right to legally trained
counsel.
34
25. See, e.g., Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372
U.S. 335 (1963); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
26. See, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) ; Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S.
478 (1964).
27. See, e.g., United States v. Tellier, 13 U.S.C.M.A. 323, 32 C.M.R. 323, 327 (1962);
United States v. Kraskouskas, 9 U.S.C.M.A. 607, 26 C.M.R. 387 (1958) and cases cited
therein.
28. See, e.g., Burns v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137 (1953); Le Ballister v. Warden, 247 F.
Supp. 349 (D. Kan. 1965); United States v. Culp, 14 U.S.C.M.A. 199, 33 C.M.R. 411
(1963); United States v. Rawdon, 9 U.S.C.M.A. 396, 26 C.M.R. 176 (1958); United States
v. Sutton, 3 U.S.C.M.A. 220, 11 ClvE.R. 220 (1953).
29. See, e.g., Matter of Stapley, 246 F. Supp. 316 (D. Utah 1965).
30. 14 U.S.C.M.A. 199, 33 C.M.R. 411, 415 (1963) (Footnotes omitted.).
31. W. Aycock & S. Wurfel, Military Law Under the Uniform Code of Military
Justice 133 (1955) and cases cited therein.
32. 3 U.S.C.M.A. 220, 11 C.M.R. 220, 223 (1953).
33. See, e.g., Matter of Stapley, 246 F. Supp. 316 (D. Utah 1965) ; Shapiro v. United
States, 69 F. Supp. 205 (1947); United States v. Mathis, 6 C.M.R. 661 (1952).
34. See, e.g., Burns v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137, 149, 152 (1953) (dissenting opinions:
Frankfurter, J., and Douglas, Black, J.j., respectively); United States v. Culp, 14
U.S.C.M.A. 199, 212-21, 33 C.M.R. 411, 428-33 (1963); United States v. Forbes, 3 C.M.R.
399 (1951); United States v. Rawdon, 9 U.S.C.M.A. 396, 26 C.M.R. 176 (1958); United
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In the instant case, petitioner made three major arguments on appeal. He
first contended that the sixth amendment constitutional right to counsel is
applicable to all military prosecutions including Special Courts-Martial, and
that this right was infringed upon when he was assigned a non-legally trained
defense counsel. Second, he argued that representation by a non-legally trained
defense counsel denied him a fair trial in violation of the due process require-
ment of the fifth amendment. Petitioner further argued that if it is found that
appointment of a non-legally trained defense counsel does not violate his fifth
and sixth amendment rights to counsel and fair trial, he was nevertheless denied
due process since article 38b of the Uniform Code of Military Justice0 5 grants
a defendant the absolute right to legally trained civilian counsel while failing
to provide similar assistance for the indigent.
After citing ample authority for the court's power to review the constitu-
tional questions involved, the court proceeded to dismiss petitioner's contentions.
It was first recognized that "at least the spirit of the Sixth Amendment right to
counsel pervades the due process requirements of military justice."8 However,
the court determined that it was unnecessary to resolve the question of whether
the sixth amendment right to counsel should be made strictly applicable to mili-
tary prosecutions, since "we are convinced that the qualifications for counsel
prescribed by Congress in Article 27 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice
fully comply with the right to counsel requirements of the Sixth Amendment."3 7
Under article 27 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice,38 defense counsel
must have had legal training equivalent to that of the trial counsel and must
also be "familiar with" the Manual for Courts-Martial and the Uniform Code
of Military Justice, including the substance of military crimes tried by Special
Courts-Martial. The court further based its conclusion on the fact that the pen-
alty for the offense would constitute a misdemeanor under civilian law, "and, it
is an open question whether the sixth amendment right to counsel is applicable
in misdemeanor cases." 391 It was argued that the practice and procedure in Special
Courts-Martial are simplified and that scope and sentencing powers are limited.
For these same reasons the court also found that due process requirements had
been satisfied.
The court dismissed petitioner's argument as to indigent discrimination by
stating:
If as we have held, the representation by non-legally trained officers
provided by Article 27(e) is adequate and effective to secure to an
accused the full equivalent of the sixth amendment right to counsel,
States v. Williamson, 4 U.S.C.MA. 320, 331 (1958) (Quinn, C.J., dissenting); Quinn, The
United States Court of Military Appeals and Individual Rights in the Military Service, 39
Notre Dame Law 491 (1960); Comment, 76 Yale L.J. 380 (1966).
35. 10 U.S.C. § 838(b) (1964).
36. 377 F.2d 339, 343 (190 ).
37. Id.
39. 10 U.S.C. § 827.
39. 377 F.2d At 343.
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he cannot be disadvantaged by his inability to hire private counsel.
To hold otherwise, would be to say that an indigent is constitutionally
entitled to appointed counsel of his choice.
40
Having dispensed with petitioner's arguments, the court unanimously affirmed
the district court's decision.
The Kennedy court considered both the limited jurisdiction of Special
Courts-Martial and its powers of limited punishment as reasons for holding that
representation by non-legally trained counsel did not violate petitioner's rights.
The applicable articles of the Uniform Code of Military Justice as to the juris-
diction of Special Courts-Martial provide:
Special courts-martial have jurisdiction to try persons subject to this
chapter for any non-capital offense made punishable by the Chapter.41
The jurisdiction therefore seems to be broader than the court's opinion would
lead one to believe, and includes offenses which would be felonies were they
tried in a civilian criminal court. Furthermore, a conviction before a Special
Court-Martial, for an offense which would be a felony if tried before a civilian
court, may in some instances be considered as a prior felony conviction if the
defendant is subsequently sentenced for a felony conviction in a civilian court.
This increases the defendant's punishment in the civilian court.42
In addition, "the scope of offenses triable by courts-martial has been
gradually but steadily broadened." 43 But, said the court, the punishment is not
of such gravity that legally trained counsel is needed. In the instant case the
defendant was sentenced to imprisonment for six months with loss of two-thirds
of his pay, but a Special Court-Martial also is authorized to grant a bad con-
duct discharge. "Indeed, the court of Military Appeals has recognized that
Special Court-Martial punitive discharges are harsher than many sentences
adjudged in a General Court-Martial." 44 Any discharge other than honorable
will follow a defendant in civilian life, and automatically reduces his veteran's
benefits. 45 While arguments have been advanced that the army has blocked bad
conduct discharges in Special Court-Martials, by requiring a verbatim tran-
script of the trial when such punishment is given,4 6 the fact that the power still
exists seems to invalidate the court's lack of severity of punishment argument.
The court based its argument as to the right of indigents to legally trained
appointed counsel on the same argument which it applied to the sixth amend-
ment right to counsel. However, the issues seem to be separable. The discrimina-
40. Id. at 344.
41. 10 U.S.C. § 819 (1964).
42. See, e.g., People v. Kadin, 41 Misc. 2d 424, 245 N.Y.S.2d 698 (1963); People v.
Shaw, 38 Misc. 2d 401, 238 N.Y.S.2d 104 (1963); People v. Wilson, 11 Misc. 2d 40, 171
N.Y.S.2d 438 (1958).
43. Wiener, slupra note 11.
44. United States v. Kelly, 5 U.S.C.MA. 259, 263, 17 C.M.R. 259, 263 (1954) (con-
curring opinion); see, e.g., Comment, The Right to Counsel in Special Courts-Martial, 50
Minn. L. Rev. 147 (1965).
45. See, e.g., Comment, 64 Colum. L. Rev. 127 (1964).
46. R. Everett, Military Justice in the Armed Forces of the United States 158 (1956).
539
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tion of allowing only those with sufficient resources the right to employ trained
civilian counsel seems to apply with equal force in both the civilian and military
spheres. In Gideon v. Wainwright,47 the Supreme Court held that an indigent
civilian defendant must have adequately trained legal counsel for his defense.
A man should have equal rights in court, whether he is a soldier or a civilian,
Furthermore, the economic fact of indigency is in many cases fostered by the
military system itself, due to the inadequate wages paid soldiers in the lower
ranks. These ranks produce most of the defendants in Special Courts-Martial;
therefore, even the statutory right to hire civilian counsel seems somewhat
illusory. The only equitable solution would be to provide all defendants, indigent
or otherwise, with adequately trained counsel. This could be administered
effectively by increasing military legal staffs. To safeguard the rights of a
potentially innocent defendant, it seems that adequately trained defense counsel
should be provided at both General and Special Courts-Martial.
As previously noted, it is an officer in the defendant's chain of command
who decides whether a defendant will be tried before a General or Special
Court-Martial. This officer has a vested interest in a conviction since he has
the responsibility for discipline within his command, and his chances for promo-
tion may depend on this discipline. In a case where it might be difficult to con-
vict a defendant before a General Court-Martial, due to the requirement of ade-
quate and legally trained counsel, the commanding officer may send the case
to a Special Court-Martial. Conviction there might be more readily assured,
since adequately trained counsel is not required.
Congress is conversant with these problems through its Senate Subcom-
mittee on Constitutional Rights, and legislation has been promoted to afford
the defendant in a Special Court-Martial the right to legally trained counsel.48
The proposed bill "was approved by the judges of the Court of Military Ap-
peals,49 the Judge Advocate Generals,r0 [and] the Department of Defense .... ,,51
Since the legal staffs of the military have approved the right to legally trained
counsel in a Special Court-Martial, this right should be implemented through
court action, especially when legislative response has been sluggish. This was the
pattern in the civilian sphere, and reason demands a similar pattern for the
military.
Some of the charges against Petitioner would have been felonies in a
civilian court and all involved moral turpitude. Furthermore, Petitioner's
assigned counsel were particularly unqualified since his defense counsel's total
training in military law was accomplished in about two days and his assistant
47. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
48. S. Rep. No. 750, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965).
49. See statements of Chief Justice Quinn, Justice Kilday and Justice Ferguson in
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights and a Special Subcomm. of the
Sen. Armed Forces Comm. in Joint Hearings on Military Justice and Military Discharges,
89th Cong., 1st Sess. 578, 608, 620 (1966).
50. See id. 27, 38-39.
51. Id.; see also Comment, 15 Catholic L. Rev. 203, 220 (1967).
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defense counsel had some training but no experience. 52 Therefore, it would
seem that one could be critical of the court's decision. On these facts the
court might have found that Kennedy was denied effective counsel, and could
have equitably decided the case without ever reaching the constitutional ques-
tions involved. But even if the court were not so disposed, it did have ample
authority to formulate a more equitable decision. It should have resolved the
constitutional question in favor of the right to counsel in Special Court-Martial.
As Blackstone has written:
No man should take up arms, but with a view to defend his country
and its laws; he puts not off the citizen when he enters the camp;
but it is because he is a citizen, and would wish to continue so, that
he makes himself for a while a soldier.
53
RicnAm LIPPES
DOMESTIC RELATIONS LAW-DmSIBLE DIVORCE-EFFECT OF SISTER
STATE Ex PARTE DIVORCE ON NEW YoRic TENANCY BY THE ENTIRETY
Edith Kolb, the plaintiff, married Henry Kolb in 1933. In 1939 they ac-
quired New York real property as tenants by the entirety.' The plaintiff was
granted an ex parte divorce' in Florida in 1960. Mr. Kolb, a resident of New
York, was served by substituted service in accordance with Florida law, but
neither answered the complaint nor appeared in the divorce proceeding. Eight
months after the Florida decree, Mr. Kolb died. Plaintiff brought this action
to declare herself, as survivor, sole owner of the real property. Plaintiff's claim
was based on the theory that the ex parte Florida divorce did not affect the
tenancy by the entirety in New York realty. Opposing her in this action was
her infant son, Roger Kolb, who claimed title to part of the real estate as dece-
dent's heir.3 His claim was based on an argument that the ex parte Florida di-
vorce changed the tenancy by the entirety into a tenancy in common, thereby
destroying his mother's right of survivorship. Held, a valid sister state ex parte
52. Note, S Duquesne U.L. Rev. 431, 435 (1967).
53. Blackstone, Commentaries *408.
1. A tenancy by the entirety is a type of property ownership available only to husband
and wife and under which the husband and wife have a right of survivorship. For a general
treatment of the subject of tenancies by the entirety, see 4 R. Powell, The Law of Real
Property 1111 620-24 (1967).
2. An ex parte divorce is one rendered by a court lacking personal jurisdiction over
the defendant spouse.
3. Pursuant to N.Y. Deced. Est. Law § 83 which provides:
The real property of a deceased person . . . shall descend . . . in the manner
following:
Subd. 5, If there be no surviving spouse, the whole thereof shall descend and be
distributed equally to and among the children ....
Section 83 was replaced by Section 4-1.1 Estates, Powers and Trusts Laws which became
effective September 1, 1967. The new section did not affect the import of subd. S.
